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EEC Law and Other Problems in
Applying the SEC Proposal on
Multinational Offerings to the U.K.t
The term "Internationalization of the Securities Markets" can be under-
stood in two ways: It can mean the internationalization of the "primary"
markets, i.e., the facilitation of initial transborder securities offerings, or
it can mean the internationalization of secondary trading, i.e., the listing
of securities on stock exchanges in more than one country.I This distinc-
tion can readily be derived from the separation of the American law of
securities regulations into two statutes, the Securities Act of 19332 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3
While it has historical reasons in the United States the distinction be-
tween issuance and trading does not necessarily make sense. Under pres-
ent EEC law securities issued and distributed to the public become subject
to regulation only if they are to be traded on the stock exchange. 4
This article focuses on the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) to facilitate multinational securities offerings as envisioned
by SEC Release No. 33-6568. 5 In this release the SEC is concerned with
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1. See Pozen, Disclosure and Trading in an International Securities Market, 15 INT'L
LAW. 84 (1981).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
4. Council Directive of 17 March 1980 (EEC) No. 80/390, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
100) art. 1, at 1 (1980) [hereinafter Prospectus Directive]. A new draft directive, however,
will cover unlisted securities as well. See 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 355) at 39 (1980).
5. Exchange Act Release No. 33-6568, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 434, 50 Fed. Reg.
9281 (1985).
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the problems of offerings made in more than one country at more or less
the same time. The SEC acknowledges that global markets for initial
offerings are evolving6 by reason of the greater need, especially for in-
stitutional investors, to diversify their portfolios and to increase the return
on their investments. 7 In 1985, although the American stock market showed
tremendous percentage increases in stock prices, the German stock mar-
ket showed even greater gains.
American investors use various methods of acquisition. Institutional
investors frequently buy directly on the foreign stock market via an Amer-
ican or foreign brokerage house. Since they usually buy large blocks of
securities, their transaction costs are comparably low. 8 On the other hand,
small investors will often buy foreign securities by purchasing American
Depository Receipts (ADRs). 9 The greatest amount of foreign securities
are traded in the ADR market. 10
A number of foreign securities are, however, traded directly in the U.S.
market. "1 Increased offering directly to the American investor in the U.S.
market will facilitate access for the foreign issuer and reduce transaction
costs to the investor. 12 The SEC's efforts to facilitate access to U.S.
capital markets can arguably be seen as difficult to reconcile with the
SEC's duty to protect investors. Several arguments, however, favor al-
lowing foreign issuers access under less stringent conditions than apply
to domestic issuers. First, compliance with U.S. disclosure standards may
involve a special hardship for the foreigner, for example, with respect to
accounting standards. 13 In addition, securities laws in general hamper the
free international flow of capital, thereby making it more difficult for
foreign issuers to reach U.S. investors. 14
One may question whether the SEC should have the responsibility of
opening new (and perhaps risky) investment opportunities for American
investors by facilitating the access of foreign issuers to the U.S. capital
market. It can also be argued, however, that, given the increased tendency
of the American investors to invest abroad, the best way to protect them
6. See generally Thomas, The Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical
Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155 (1982).
7. Id. at 163; Merloe, Internationalization of Securities Markets: A Critical Survey of U.S.
and EEC Disclosure Requirements, 8 J. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 249, 251 (1986).
8. Thomas, supra note 6, at 167.
9. Id. at 169 n.53.
10. See Royston, The Regulation of American Depository Receipts: Americanization of
the International Capital Markets, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 87, 106 (1985).
II. See Pozen, International Securities Markets: Comparative Disclosure Requirements,
3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 392, 422 (1981).
12. See Thomas, supra note 6, at 170.
13. Id. at 158.
14. Id. at 168.
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is to have the transaction occur on an American instead of a foreign
exchange. The SEC can police the foreign issuer most effectively if the
issuer's shares are traded here, 15 even though recent tendencies abroad,
for example, in the EEC, show more rigid disclosure requirements as
well.
In its concern for multinational offerings, 16 the SEC focuses basically
on a three-country mutual offering facilitation to include the U.S., Canada,
and the U.K., 17 having in mind some recent simultaneous offerings of
U.K. and Canadian securities in the U.S. The release emphasizes the
similarity of the regulatory approaches in those three countries. Of the
European countries, the U.K. is presently the only one that has imple-
mented into national law EEC harmonization legislation with regard to
securities regulation. 18 Most authors emphasize the influence of the EEC
Prospectus Directive on recent developments of U.S. disclosure rules for
foreign issuers. 19 In other words, the inclusion of the U.K. in a multi-
national offering facilitation effort will be a paradigm for the opening of
the U.S. capital market to the European issuer and a litmus test for the
similarity of disclosure requirements in a transatlantic securities market.
Two considerations seem to facilitate a mutual recognition of prospec-
tuses with regard to the U.K. First, the lack of a language barrier. Other
European issuers who try to gain easy access to the North American
securities market would have to translate the material, even if disclosure
requirements in Europe and North America were in perfect harmony.
Secondly, U.K. issuers have more often crossed the Atlantic with initial
offerings and therefore have more experience in coping with the U.S.
securities laws. U.K. issuers might be less frightened by the liability
provisions in the U.S. The SEC Release emphasizes the similarities be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K. disclosure requirements, 20 but fails to focus
on the recent implementation of three EEC directives that have substan-
tially modified U.K. law.
This article reviews similarities and differences between U.S. and U.K.
law with special emphasis on the EEC harmonization effort. Eventually
the SEC proposal contained in SEC Release 33-6568 might be modified
15. Id. at 167-68.
16. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., supra note 5, at 435.
17. Id. at 434.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 114-31.
19. See Merloe, supra note 7, at 255. Pierce, The Regulation of the Issuance and Trading
of Securities in the U.S. and the E.E.C.: A Comparison, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
129, 133 (1981); Thomas, supra note 6, at 168; Note, Foreign Securities: Integration and
Disclosure under the Securities and Exchange Acts, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 919
(1983).
20. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep., supra note 5, at 435-36.
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to include offerings by other EEC issuers as well. The National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers suggested this idea in its comment on the SEC
Release. 21 Therefore this article does not focus exclusively on the fea-
sibility of harmonizing U.S. and U.K. disclosure requirements but also
considers the EEC securities law in general.
The SEC approach is to look at the present state of the disclosure
requirements in the U.K. and Canada and to compare them to U.S. law.
The SEC envisions a joint harmonizing effort either by reciprocal rec-
ognition of prospectuses or the creation of a common prospectus. Either
of those prospectuses would have to conform to a maximum extent with
the securities laws of all three countries. In addition, a multinational
offering involves timing and liability problems that require a focus on the
different administrative procedures and the liability provisions.
Finally, a harmonization and facilitation effort across the Atlantic will
be feasible only if the countries are allowed discretionary room to modify
the present disclosure requirements. Administrative regulations are much
easier to modify than statutory provisions. For example, the SEC can
rather easily create a new registration form with less rigid disclosure
requirements. The minimum statutory disclosure requirements are con-
tained in Schedule A of the 1933 Act. These minimum requirements give
the SEC a broad range of discretion with respect to details. Such ease of
modification is not the case under EEC law. The contents of the prospectus
is predefined by the EEC directive and is not subject to the discretion of
the competent administrative authorities or even the national legislatures.
In short, any facilitation effort must start by establishing the largest
common denominator for disclosure. Once this core is found, it remains
to be seen how the remaining barriers can be removed, that is, how to
guarantee indispensable minimum disclosure. Since the SEC envisions a
mutual facilitation, another important inquiry is whether a U.S. prospec-
tus would satisfy EEC disclosure standards. In that regard it should be
emphasized again that the U.K. is not free to grant exemptions from EEC
disclosure requirements, since the Prospectus Directive sets forth mini-
mum standards in the EEC that cannot be undercut. This limitation is
acknowledged by the London Stock Exchange. 22
This article, then, encompasses a comparison of U.S. and U.K. dis-
closure requirements with emphasis on the indispensable minimum U.S.
and EEC standards of disclosure in order to determine the feasibility of
21. See Summary of Comments on Concept Release Facilitation of Multinational Securities
Offerings by the SEC Division of Corporation Finance at 14, SEC Release No. 33-6568,
File No. S 7-9-85 (Jan. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Summary of Comments] (copy on file with the
author).
22. Id. at 15.
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the proposals set forth in SEC Release 33-6568. Before examining the
release in more detail, the present state of disclosure requirements for
foreign issuers for initial distribution under the new integrated disclosure
system in the U.S. are summarized.
1. The Present Status of Foreign Issuers in the-U.S.
A. REGISTRATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT
If a foreign issuer wants to offer securities in the U.S. by the "juris-
dictional means," it must, as a general rule, comply with the registration
requirement of section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act, 23 except, of course,
if it qualifies for one of the small offering or private offering exemptions
as contained in sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the 1933 Act and in Regulations
A and D.24 Otherwise, the issuer can avoid application of the 1933 Act
only if the original primary distribution took place outside of the U.S.
and all offered securities have come to rest abroad. 25 If the securities are
thereafter injected into the U.S. secondary trading market, the issuer will
be subject to SEC action only if it actively encourages trading. 26
1. Forms F-1, F-2, F-3
The SEC has eased disclosure requirements for foreign issuers by in-
troducing the "F-series" forms F-I, F-2, and F-3. 27 These forms are part
of the new integrated disclosure system. 28 They consist of two parts. Part
I is completely identical to the "S-series" forms for initial distribution of
domestic securities; the registrant has to furnish the "500-series" items
of Regulation S-K and Item 202 of Regulation S-K. 29
Under Item 501 the issuer has to furnish a specific forepart and front
cover page of the prospectus. Item 502 defines the contents of the inside
front and outside back cover pages. Item 503 requires summary infor-
mation, and the description of risk factors and earnings ratios. In Item
504 the issuer has to explain the use of the proceeds. Item 505 requires
an explanation of the computation of the offering price in some cases.
23. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS
1304 (5th ed. 1982).
24. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1986); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 88 230.501-
.506 (1986).
25. See Note, supra note 19, at 916.
26. Id. at 916-17.
27. Form F-I, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771 (1982); Form F-2, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,773 (1982); Form
F-3, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,776 (1982); Convenient Reference: 2 DONELLY, SEC HANDBOOK 11-
2-3 (1985).
28. See generally Bloomenthal, The Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Issuers, 5
Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman) (Feb. 1983).
29. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.800 (1986).
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Under Item 506 the dilution of equity resulting from the sale of stock by
existing shareholders has to be disclosed. These selling shareholders have
to be named under Item 507. The remaining items require a description
of the plan of distribution (Item 508), a disclosure of the interest of named
experts and counsel (Item 509), a statement on the SEC's negative view
with respect to indemnification of officers for possible liabilities under the
securities acts (Item 510), and a description of the costs of the issuance
and distribution (Item 511).
Forms F-I, F-2, and F-3 are patterned after the forms for domestic
issuers S-I, S-2, and S-3. These domestic forms create an integrated
disclosure system, which allows the incorporation by reference of infor-
mation filed under the 1934 Exchange Act. The idea behind the integrated
disclosure system is to avoid the filing of information that is already in
the hands of the SEC. In other words, the longer an issuer has been a
reporting company under the 1934 Exchange Act, the more information
can be incorporated by reference to these reports. This same idea has
been implemented for foreign issuers as well.
In part II of Form F-I the issuer has to give the information contained
in the basic registration form for foreign issuers under the 1934 Exchange
Act, Form 20-F.30 Under Form F-I all information under Form 20-F has
to be given, whereas under Forms F-2 and F-3, this information can be
incorporated by reference.
F-I is the basic registration form that has to be used, unless the issuer
qualifies for either Form F-2 or F-3. The registrant can use Form F-2 if
he meets either of the following conditions: (1) The issuer is a reporting
company under section 12 or 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act and has
been filing all the required forms for the last thirty-six months, 31 or (2)
the registrant is a "world class" issuer and has filed at least one Form
20-F.32 An issuer is considered to be "world class" if the aggregate market
value of its stock held by nonaffiliates ("float") exceeds $300 million. A
registrant who qualifies for Form F-2 can incorporate its latest 20-F by
reference and simply furnish an update. Under Form F-2 a copy of the
latest 20-F has to be filed as an exhibit. 33
A registrant qualifies for F-3 if it is a "world class" issuer and has been
reporting under sections 12 or 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act for at least
36 months. 34 A non-"world class" issuer that has been a reporting com-
pany for at least thirty-six months can use Form F-3 for "investment
30. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.220(f) (1986) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 55-62).
31. See supra note 27, Form F-2, General Instructions (B)(1), at 54,773.
32. Id. General Instructions (B)(2), at 54,774.
33. Id. Items II and 12, at 54,774.
34. See supra note 27, Form F-3, General Instructions (A)(2) and (A)(4), at 54,778.
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grade nonconvertible debt." 35 Form F-3 is almost identical to Form F-2,
i.e., the issuer can incorporate the latest 20-F and only has to update the
information contained therein. Under F-3 however, no copy needs to be
included in the filing.
Under Forms F-2 and F-3 the financial information in the latest 20-F
must be conformed to Item 18, i.e., to U.S. GAAP and Regulation S-X.
36
The lesser financial disclosure standards, as contained in Item 17 of Form
10-F, may be used only for the issue of rights to existing shareholders in
specific cases (provided that one such Form 20-F has been filed). If these
conditions have been met, Form F-2 or F-3 may be used for rights offer-
ings. 37 In an offering of investment grade nonconvertible debt securities
on Form F-3, it is also sufficient that the latest 20-F contain Item 17
financial information, instead of the stricter standards contained in Item
18.38
The Appendix Table I clarifies this rather confusing scheme and shows
under what circumstances the different forms may be used.
39
2. American Depository Receipts-Form F-6
The registration of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) is by com-
parison much easier than the registration of foreign securities offered
directly to the public. ADRs represent foreign securities held by a U.S.
bank or trust company (depository).40 One ADR represents one or more
securities. ADRs are of course securities themselves and are subject to
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. 4 1 As long as the issuer of
the underlying foreign securities does not actively encourage trading, the
SEC will not enforce the securities laws against it (the so-called "vol-
untarism" principle). 42 The foreign issuer is not deemed to be the issuer
of the ADRs. 43 The depository provides the service functions; it collects
the interest or dividends and converts them into U.S. currency. 44 The
issue of the ADRs is usually undertaken by an investment bank, 45 which
35. Id., General Instructions (B)(2) and (A)(4), at 54,778.
36. See supra note 27, Form F-2, General Instructions (D) at 54,774; Form F-3, General
Instructions (B)(1), at 54,778. (Item 18 in Form 20-F is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 56-61.
37. See supra note 27, Form F-2, General Instructions (E), at 54,774.
38. See supra note 27, Form F-3, General Instructions (B)(2), at 54,778.
39. See also Merloe, supra note 7, at 262.
40. See generally Royston, supra note 10, at 87.
41. Id. at 88.
42. Id. at 88-89. These ADRs are called "unsponsored"; see Thomas, supra note 6, at
69 n.53.
43. See Royston, supra note 10, at 96.
44. See Note, supra note 19, at 912 n.5.
45. See Royston, supra note 10, at 97.
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negotiates the depository agreement with the depository. The terms of
this agreement generally appear on the ADR certificate itself.46
Since most of the ADRs provide that the underlying security may be
withdrawn by the holder of the ADR, difficult problems with regard to
the 1933 Act may arise. 47 The depository may be viewed as an underwriter,
if the underlying security is withdrawn. Also an open question is whether
the security holder who withdraws may sell the foreign security without
restriction under section 4 of the 1933 Act. 48
The issuer of the ADR, that is the investment bank, has to file a Form
F-6. Prerequisite to use Form F-6 is registration of the underlying foreign
securities or exemption of the securities from registration under the 1933
Act. 49 For example, if the foreign security was acquired in a private
transaction, no registration is necessary under section 4(2) of the 1933
Act. In addition, the issuer of the underlying securities must be either a
reporting company or a company exempt from the reporting requirements
under SEC rule 12g3-2. Alternatively, the issuer may register concurrently
by filing a Form 20-F.50 In addition, registration on Form F-6 is possible
only if the underlying securities may be withdrawn by the ADR holder.
If those requirements are met, registration of the ADRs on Form F-6
is fairly simple. The information of Item 202(f) of Regulation S-K has to
be filed, plus a statement that information about the issuer of the under-
lying security is available at the offices of the SEC.51 The prospectus can
consist of a copy of the ADR certificate itself.52 In addition the only
documents to be filed are the depository agreement and some minor ex-
hibits. 53 In sum, registration is fairly convenient. Note, however, that
Form F-6 cannot be used to distribute the underlying securities to the
public 54 and that the foreign issuer must be registered under the 1934
Exchange Act or be exempt from registration.
B. FORM 20-F
Under the integrated disclosure system, the core of any issue of a
security on the F-series forms is the information to be filed on Form 20-F.
46. Id. at 97.
47. Id. at 104-06 (the underlying security must be withdrawable if the ADRs are to be
registered on Form F-6).
48. See Royston, supra note 10, at 104-06.
49. See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §§ 7001-7005 (Mar. 18, 1983); Form F-6, General
Instructions (I)(A)(2).
50. Id. General Instructions (I)(A)(3).
51. Id. Part I, Items I and 2.
52. Id. General Instructions III.B.
53. Id. Part 11, Item 3.
54. See Royston, supra note 10, at 91.
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The best way to approach this form is to review briefly the differences
and similarities between the disclosure for domestic issuers on Form 10-K
and the more lenient requirements under Form 20-F.5 5 Like a domestic
issuer, the foreign registrant has to furnish Management's Discussion and
Analysis (Item 9), Selected Financial Data (Item 8), Legal Proceedings
(Item 3), Directors and Executive Officers (Item 10), and Description of
Properties (Item 2). Special provisions apply to oil and gas properties that
will not be discussed here. The issuer must in addition furnish special
information that takes into account the special problems of offerings of
foreign securities: information about the currency exchange rate and re-
strictions in transborder capital flow (Item 6) and Taxation (Item 7).
The disclosure requirements are less strict in the following areas: the
description of business is less extensive (Item 1); the description of re-
search and development, new products, and services is less exhaustive.
The most important relaxation is in the area of "segmented" reporting:
the breakdown of sales and profits into the different fields of activity and
geographical markets is less stringent. Segmented reporting is information
that foreign issuers are reluctant to publish. 56
The other area of major concession toward the needs of the foreign
issuer is that of management remuneration (Item 11). The disclosure of
an aggregate amount is sufficient. The individual salaries have to be given
only if they are disclosed to the issuer's shareholders or if they are other-
wise made public. The same concession has been made concerning the
management's ownership of the registrant's shares. The aggregate amount
is sufficient disclosure unless the individual holdings are published else-
where. The same is true for options held by the management.
Another relaxation has been implemented with respect to certain trans-
actions between the management and the issuer and/or its subsidiaries.
These transactions have to be disclosed only to the extent that this in-
formation is made public at the issuer's domicile (Item 13). Even if the
information has to be disclosed, the disclosure is less detailed than for
domestic issuers.
One of the major concessions (if not the most important) has been
achieved in the area of financial information. The foreign issuer can furnish
financial statements according to the GAAP of its home country, if the
divergences between these standards and U.S. generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP) are explained (Items 17 and 18). In other
words, the financial statements need to be reconciled quantitatively. The
issuer is given a choice between Items 17 and 18. The only difference
55. See generally Bloomenthal, supra note 28, at 10-16; Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220(f)
(1982).
56. See Pozen, supra note 1, at 85.
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between Items 17 and 18 is that in Item 18, with exception of the balance
sheets, the financial information must conform to U.S. GAAP and Reg-
ulation S-X.57 This requirement includes segmented reporting. Under
Item 18, therefore, not only the "measurement principles," but also the
"disclosure principles" must be reconciled.58 To state it differently, Item
18 takes away the concession made in Item I for most practical purposes.
In order to be of any use to the foreign issuer, Form 20-F has to comply
with Item 18, since compliance with this item in the latest Form 20-F is
a prerequisite for almost all offerings registered on Forms F-2 or F-3. 59
This can readily be derived from Table 1.
The only case where Item 17 can be used is for the offering of investment
grade nonconvertible debt by a company that has reported for at least
thirty-six months under the 1934 Exchange Act. Even a "world class"
issuer has to furnish the increased financial disclosure demanded by Item
18 for an ordinary securities offering for cash. 60 The only case where this
hurdle does not exist are Eurobond issues, which are placed mostly pri-
vately with institutional investors. 61 However in the future, it is possible
that the SEC will grant waivers.62
To evaluate the burden imposed by the present U.S. disclosure system,
one has to compare these requirements with the present state of disclosure
under foreign law. This comparison is developed in section V below.
I!. The SEC Proposal for Multinational Offerings
The SEC Release 33-6568 is less a proposal than an invitation for com-
ment on how to deal with the problem of multinational offerings in the
future. The SEC briefly outlines two basic concepts, but does not propose
any detailed regulatory schemes. The SEC is concerned with some recent
simultaneous offerings. For example the Reuter plc. offering grew out of
the assumption that one single securities market alone could not possibly
have absorbed the entire issue. 63 Another reason for multinational offer-
57. See Form 20-F, Item 18(3), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,781, 54,788 (1982).
58. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 18 n. 1l.
59. See supra note 27, Form F-2, General Instructions (D), at 54,774; Form F-3, General
Instructions (B)(1) and (B)(3) at 54,778.
60. For a critique of disclosure demands, see Merloe, supra note 7, at 263; Note supra
note 19, at 923. But see Karmel, The SEC Goes International, 193 N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1985,
at 4, col. 2 (expressing the opposite view).
61. See Note, supra note 19, at 923.
62. See Thomas, Increased Access to U.S. Capital Markets: A Brief Look at the SEC's
New Integrated Disclosure Rules for Foreign Issuers, 5 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L.
129, 132 (1983).
63. See Letter of the Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law of the ABA,
Appendix A at 4-5 (July 15, 1985) (response on the SEC's request for comment) [hereinafter
ABA-Letter] (copy on file with the author).
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ings is that trading a share on more than one national exchange enhances
its value. 64 In the release the SEC correctly points out that prospectus
uniformity alone is no solution. Divergences in the registration procedure
and different liability provisions prove to be as cumbersome as different
disclosure requirements. 6 5
A. RECIPROCITY VERSUS COMMONALITY
The two different approaches in easing the disclosure requirements
proposed by the SEC are the reciprocity approach and the common pro-
spectus approach. Under the reciprocity approach, the three countries
would agree to accept mutually the prospectuses filed in the home juris-
diction of the issuer under the condition that they meet a minimum stan-
dard agreed upon in advance. Review would be limited to the authorities
in the home jurisdiction. The common prospectus approach would en-
vision a single prospectus format agreed upon by the three countries that
would of course lead to completely uniform disclosure standards. The
liability provisions would remain unchanged under both approaches. 66
The SEC is aware that the latter approach is much more unrealistic,
since the three countries would have to agree on a common disclosure
standard. 6 7 The SEC notes the following advantages for the reciprocity
approach: it is simpler to implement, and is less costly and time consuming
to achieve. 68 In the SEC's view the disadvantage of the reciprocity ap-
proach is that the participating countries might perhaps give up further
efforts to harmonize disclosure and that the result would probably be less
disclosure than under a common prospectus approach. 69 To the SEC the
common prospectus approach has the advantage of creating a greater
harmonization. 70
The common prospectus approach would, however, not necessarily
offer the same high disclosure standards now present in U.S. law. To
achieve a common prospectus the U.S. would have to make compromises
with respect to the minimum information. A disadvantage for the common
prospectus seen by the SEC is the probably higher transaction cost for
the foreign issuer resulting from a multiple review under the common
prospectus approach. 7 1 However, it seems that under a reciprocity sys-
64. Id. at 15.
65. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. supra note 5, at 435-36.
66. Id. at 436.
67. Id.
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tern, too, the issuer cannot be completely relieved from multiple filings,
and under a modified reciprocity approach as proposed in the ABA-Letter
discussed below, some limited form of review in the host country will be
unavoidable. In addition, conceptually, there is no reason why a common
prospectus should be reviewed by more than one authority.
B. THE REQUEST FOR COMMENT
In order to evaluate further the different options for dealing with the
recurring problems in this area, the SEC requested comments from the
securities lawyers' community. In addition, the SEC asked seventeen
specific questions. 72 In total, the SEC received seventy responses, and
fifty of fifty-seven responses that expressed a preference favored the rec-
iprocity approach. 73
The Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the ABA
wrote a lengthy comment. 74 The ABA, as well as most of the other pro-
ponents of a reciprocity approach, proposes a "modified" reciprocity
approach, that is that a foreign prospectus be supplemented by additional
disclosure of indispensable information. 75 Other commentators, including
the London Stock Exchange, favor a per se reciprocity, suggesting that
at present, the U.K. and Canadian prospectuses satisfy U.S. disclosure
standards. 76 The ABA mentions that its proposal is in line with the limited
reciprocity of the EEC Prospectus Directive. 77 The letter further proposes
to limit the application of any multinational offering regulation on "world
class" issuers, at least in the initial stage. 78
The ABA view reflects a deep mistrust of foreign disclosure principles
by U.S. securities lawyers. The indispensable minimum supplemental
information to be furnished according to the ABA is a description of the
methodology of distribution in the particular foreign jurisdiction, a rec-
onciliation of foreign accounting principles (like the one presently con-
tained in Item 17 or 18 of Form 20-F), a "Management's Discussion and
Analysis," and some open-ended additional information, including Reg-
ulation S-X, Item 18 segmented financials. 79
The comment by Roberta S. Karmel, the former SEC Commissioner,
seems similarly skeptical about abandoning segmented financials. 80 On
72. Id.
73. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 23.
74. ABA-Letter, supra note 63.
75. Id. at 4.
76. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 29.
77. ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at 5.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. See Karmel, supra note 60, at 4, col. 4.
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the other hand, any attempt to preserve U.S. GAAP as an indispensable
disclosure item will severely hamper maximum reciprocity. Some Euro-
pean companies also expressed concern about segmented financials. 8 1 As
will be seen, EEC law requires segmented reporting if the revenues are
disproportionately distributed among different segments. The chance that
any material information is withheld from the investors in the U.S. is
minimal. What is more certain is that some supplemental information
items are indispensable for the U.S. investor, notably information about
currency exchange rates and exchange controls. Any such supplemental
information required should, however, be absolutely indispensable in or-
der to achieve maximum reciprocity.
The ABA additionally points out that other obstacles have to be over-
come, like divergences in liability provisions, in the review procedure,
and in periodic reporting.8 2 The letter proposes a grace period for new-
comers, having in mind that the most recent multinational offering, such
as British Telecom and Reuter's, involved companies going public for the
first time. 83 In addition the letter points out the divergences in the review
proceedings that can involve delicate timing problems. 84 The letter also
highlights problems of prefiling communications and the problems of ar-
bitrage in the immediate aftermarket. 85
Other comments seem to favor the reciprocity approach, but suggest a
reconciliation of the financial statements with the accounting standards
of the country where the security is offered. 86 Questions remain as to
whether straight compliance with the present requirements of Item 18
should be required, or whether a financial statement according to the
issuer's domicile plus a supplemental statement explaining the differences
might be sufficient. The opinions expressed varied. 87 Some commentators
apparently cautioned against proceeding too quickly and urged restraint
in doing away with the present legal situation. 88
Canadian securities regulators proposed a go-ahead of a U.S., Canadian
solution with the chance of the U.K. joining later.8 9 The inclusion of the
U.K. in a multinational offering facilitation effort is, however, especially
81. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 18, 37.
82. See ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at 10.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 12-13.
85. Id. at 14.
86. See Multinational Securities Offerings Discussed at NASAA Annual Conference, 17
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1752 (1985).
87. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 33-34.
88. See ABA-Letter supra note 63, at 15.
89. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 33-34.
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desirable. The integration of the U.K. could prove to be an opener for a
later version including the EEC as a whole. 90
III. Initial Offerings in the U.K. before 1985
The U.K. can serve as an example of how an EEC directive is imple-
mented into national law. In order to understand the effect of that imple-
mentation, and the present state of U.K. law, it may be helpful to look
at the situation before 1985, the date on which the new U.K. listing
regulations became effective. The difficulty is that the U.K. has three
regulatory frameworks that overlap and intertwine.
A. THE COMPANIES ACT OF 1948
Under section 434 of the 1948 Companies Act, a company must register
if there are more than twenty subscribers. Under sections 37 through 55,
a prospectus has to be filed with the Registrar of Companies, and no
security may be issued unless accompanied by a prospectus. The Stock
Exchange, however, can under section 39 of the 1948 Companies Act,
exempt a company from the statutory prospectus requirement. A company
whose shares are traded on the Stock Exchange is subject to the Stock
Exchange Regulations. In other words, the prospectus delivery require-
ment under the Stock Exchange Regulations will generally supersede the
statutory obligation. 9 1 The Prospectus under the Stock Exchange Rules
will fulfill the statutory requirements for disclosure under the Companies
Act. 9 2
B. THE "YELLOW BOOK"
The Stock Exchange Regulations are contained in a looseleaf binder
with a yellow cover, hence, these regulations are usually referred to as
the "Yellow Book. ' 93 The provisions are completely self-regulatory. The
Stock Exchange is a private corporation and companies who want their
shares to be traded must, by private agreement, comply with the Yellow
Book. Before the transformation of EEC law in 1985, the Stock Exchange
was completely free to grant exemptions from the provisions of the Yellow
Book, as long as the statutory minimum disclosure standard was not
90. This position is also taken by Merloe, supra note 7, at 267.
91. See Morgan, Admission of Securities to Listing, 1985 J. Bus. L. 370, 371; J. KLAGES,
DIE RICHTLINIE DER EG UBER DEN B6RSENZULASSUNGSPROSPEKT 57 (1981).
92. See J. KLAGES, supra note 91, at 59.
93. Id.
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undercut. 94 The Yellow Book disclosure standards are much stricter than
the EEC standards. Nevertheless, since a waiver of disclosure require-
ments that go beyond the EEC standards is still possible, 95 the Yellow
Book provisions do not pose a serious threat to harmonization efforts
with regard to multinational offerings.
Distribution methods under the Stock Exchange Rules differ in part
from U.S. underwriting methods. Four different methods exist for the
distribution of securities; in all cases, however, a prospectus must be
delivered. 96 A public issue can be offered without involvement of an
underwriter. Called a "Public Issue by Prospectus," the issuer directly
contacts the investing public. The investors subscribe directly with the
issuer. This method works only for issuers already known to the public.
Another offering method is the "Offer for Sale," where a so-called "Is-
suing House," i.e., an underwriter, assumes the task of distribution to
the public. A third method is called a "Placing," where a broker buys
the entire issue and then sells the stock subsequently to his clients. This
method is permitted only upon special approval by the Stock Exchange,
which is granted only if no public demand is expected. The last possible
method of distribution is an "Introduction," a sale of a security that is
already in the hands of the public. 97
C. ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
Under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, a special pro-
spectus liability is created, but securities listed on the Stock Exchange
are exempt under section 14.98 Another liability provision is, or rather
was, contained in sections 38 and 43 of the Companies Act of 1948. 99
Section 38 covered the case of missing information, whereas section 43
covered false statements. Both provisions made liable the persons re-
sponsible for the prospectus, such as directors, promotors, and account-
ants. Reliance on expert opinion was a defense, as well as due diligence. 100
These provisions are still in existence in the new Companies Act of 1985,
as sections 56, 66, and 67, but they do not apply to prospectuses for listed
securities. 101
94. See Morgan, supra note 91, at 371.
95. Id.
96. See J. KLAGES, supra note 91, at 59-60.
97. Id.
98. See Morgan, supra note 91, at 383.
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IV. The New U.K. Listing Regulations under EEC Law
A. THE EEC DIRECTIVES
The European Community makes fairly comprehensive efforts to har-
monize company law in its member states. 102 Part of that effort is directed
at the harmonization of the capital markets. The EEC has issued three
directives that deal with capital market law: the Listing or Admissions
directive promulgated March 5, 1979; 103 the aforementioned Prospectus
Directive; 0 4 and the Interim Reports directive of February 15, 1982.105
In addition there exists a draft directive on prospectuses for unlisted
securities. 106
1. Nature and Effect of a Directive
The EEC Treaty 10 7 establishes the goal of a Common Market, and one
of the basic prerequisites for creating it is the harmonization of the law
in the member states. Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty gives the council
of ministers the power to coordinate the legal frameworks of the member
states and to use directives to achieve that goal. The effect of a directive
is laid down in article 189(3) of the EEC Treaty. According to this pro-
vision, a directive is binding on the state to which it is addressed, but the
state has a discretion on how to implement it. An EEC directive is,
therefore, supranational law. The order expressed by a harmonization
directive is to enact legislation that gives effect to the substantive contents
of the directive. As an example, article 3 of the Prospectus Directive
states: "Member States shall ensure that the admission of securities to
official listing on a stock exchange situated or operating within their ter-
ritories is conditional upon the publication of an information sheet, herein-
after referred to as listing particulars." 108
102. See generally M. LUTTER, EUROPkASCHES GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 3-7 (2d ed. 1984);
Merloe, supra note 7, at 256-60, 268-71.
103. Council Directive of 15 March 1979 (EEC) No. 79/279, 22 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
66) 21 (1979) (coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to official stock
exchange listing).
104. See supra note 4.
105. Council Directive of 15 February 1982 (EEC) No. 82/121, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 48) 26 (1982) (information to be published on a regular basis by companies the shares of
which have been admitted to official stock exchange listing).
106. See supra note 4 (disclosure requirements are almost identical to the ones contained
in the Prospectus Directive).
107. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
108. Prospectus Directive, supra note 4, at 2.
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A directive is a unique creation of European law. 109 Whether directives
that are not yet given legislative effect might have a "direct effect" is a
matter of discussion.'1 0 The problem is that the deadlines given to the
member states to implement the directives are almost never met. The
deadline for the Prospectus Directive expired in 1982; the first country to
give effect to the directive was the U.K. in 1985. In the case of harmo-
nization directives that do not grant specific rights to the individual, it
should, however, be fairly clear that the only addressees are the member
states. Even though the directives can be fairly detailed, there is no ob-
ligation to copy them word for word; it is sufficient, if the substantive
provisions are given effect."'
Under article 169 of the EEC Treaty the only way for the EEC Com-
mission to enforce the directive is to initiate an enforcement action and,
eventually, to sue the noncomplying country in the European Court of
Justice." 2 According to article 171 of the Treaty, however, a judgment
would be merely declaratory. The success of any harmonization effort is
therefore entirely dependent on the good will of the member states.
2. The Listing Directive
The listing directive is basically intended to create uniform conditions
for the admission of a security to the stock exchanges (article 4(1)). These
conditions are only minimum conditions, and the member states are free
to erect additional barriers for admission (article 5), subject, however, to
the principle of equal treatment (article 7). The directive ensures that
there is a competent authority to supervise compliance with the listing
requirements (article 9) and that the public will have access to the infor-
mation that is to be filed (article 17). These conditions are different for
debt and equity and are contained in Schedules A and B, which define
the minimum size of the company, the degree of distribution to the public,
etc. If shares of a nonmember country are not traded at the stock exchange
of the home country, admission is only possible if the securities are not
barred from being traded there for the purpose of investor protection
(Schedule A.II.B.). 113
109. M. LUTTER, supra note 102, at 5; see also Zuleeg, Die Rechtswirkung Europdischer
Richilinien, 1980 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 471.
110. See generally Easson, The "Direct Effect" of EEC Directives, 28 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 319 (1979) (answer: it depends).
11. See Zuleeg, supra note 109, at 471-72.
112. For a more detailed exposition of the procedure, see Ebke, Enforcement Techniques
Within the European Communities: Flying Close to the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR
L. & COM. 685 (1985).
113. See Wooldridge, Some Recent Community Legislation in the Field of Securities Law,
10 EUR. L. REV. 3, 8 (1985).
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Schedules B and C stipulate duties for the issuer to give the public at
large access to financial information, usually by publication of the yearly
balance sheet and a report on the present situation of the company, plus
any material information likely to affect the market value of the securities
(Schedules C.4. and C.5.). The information given to the public must be
equal in all national markets where the security is traded (Schedule C.6.).
3. The Prospectus Directive
This directive requires the member states to make the publication of a
"listing particular" a condition for listing at the stock exchange (article 3).
Article 4 determines that the listing particulars must contain the infor-
mation necessary to enable investors and their advisers to make an in-
formed assessment of assets and liabilities, profits or losses, and prospects
of the issuer. Article 4(2) also stipulates that the member states shall
ensure that this obligation is "incumbent" on the persons responsible for
the listing particular. Under articles 6 and 7 the competent authorities
may grant an exemption from the disclosure requirements in specific cases.
Article 6(e) mentions securities already traded on the stock exchange of
a member state, but no exemption exists for which a U.S. issuer seeking
access to a stock exchange in an EEC member country might qualify.
Article 18 imposes a duty to appoint a competent authority to review the
listing particulars before they are published, that is an agency very similar
to the SEC.
If a listing particular is published or will be published, the issuer has
to file all the other material published in connection with the offer, and
the competent authority will decide whether these publications should be
submitted to scrutiny before publication (article 22). The only substantive
provision with respect to these prefiling communications is that they must
state that a listing particular will be or is published and where it is available
(article 22, second clause).
Under article 24(2) a listing particular requirement exemption can be
granted under the condition that a previous offering in another member
state occurred less than six months before and that a translation and
supplemental information to comply with the requirements of the member
state where admission is sought is furnished. This provision has to be
read together with article 5, which sets forth that the disclosure require-
ments are mere minimum standards; the member states are free to require
more, but not less, information. This approach is very similar to the ABA's
proposed modified reciprocity approach. Schedules A (for stocks) and B
(for bonds) set forth the substantive disclosure standards. Schedule A
will be discussed below when it is compared to the U.S. disclosure stan-
dards. The provisions of Schedule B are almost identical.
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4. The Interim Reports Directive
This directive imposes a duty on member states to ensure that issuers
publish half yearly reports. The reports should at least contain tables on
net returns and pre-tax and after-tax profits, and also appropriate com-
ments (Article 5).
B. THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.K.
Since the disclosure requirements in the Yellow Book are similar, but
not identical, to those contained in the Prospectus Directive, it was not
possible to implement the three directives by simply giving the Yellow
Book statutory power. 1 14 The Yellow Book contains, for the most part,
more stringent provisions. 115 Instead the U.K. chose to adopt the directive
verbatim in the so-called Listing Regulations. 116 In turn, the Yellow Book
was amended to include not only the Stock Exchange disclosure require-
ments, but also the legislative Listing Regulations, so that the Yellow
Book is still a comprehensive enumeration of all applicable disclosure
requirements. 117 Nevertheless, only the Listing Regulations have statu-
tory power. 1 8 Since the admission to listing was self-regulatory before
the Listing Regulations became effective, the issuer had to enter into a
listing agreement. This requirement is now obsolete.'' 9
The same applies to the prospectus requirement. Strangely enough,
however, the new Companies Act of 1985, which consolidated the old
1948 Act, fails to refer to the new Listing Regulations, although it was
enacted later.120 Not yet clear (although likely) is whether the EEC pro-
spectus will conform with the requirements of the Companies Act. 121 This
matter is important when it comes to the question of what exhibits must
be furnished and who has to sign the documents. Still an open question
is whether compliance with the Listing Regulations will preempt appli-
cation of the Companies Act. 122 The fact that the discretion of the Stock
Exchange to grant waivers has been severely curtailed has been
criticized. 123
114. Id. at 7 n.19.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Morgan, supra note 91, at 371.
117. Id.
118. See Wooldridge, supra note 113, at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. See Morgan, supra note 91, at 378.
121. Id. at 380.
122. See Wooldridge, supra note 113, at 20 n.20.
123. Id. at 20.
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An even more "ungodly jumble' 124 appears in the area of liability
provisions. The U.K. apparently understood article 4(2) of the Pro-
spectus Directive as imposition of a duty to implement a liability pro-
vision to ensure compliance with the disclosure requirements. 125 This
idea is far-fetched, since article 4(2) merely states that the duty of
compliance with the disclosure requirements has to be "incumbent"
on the persons responsible for the prospectus. This wording does not
indicate that a civil liability has to be created. A criminal liability or
an administrative enforcement procedure would have done just as well.
Be it as it may, section 5(2) of the Listing Regulations contains a civil
liability provision, which, however, does not fit very well into the
preexisting regulatory framework. The defense under section 5(2) is
either lack of knowledge of the omitted facts, or an honest mistake of
fact, or immateriality of the omission or falsity, as determined by the
court. 126 The defenses under section 67 of the 1985 Companies Act
are limited to due diligence.127
In addition, it is unclear who can sue under the new provisions
of the Listing Regulations, and who can be sued as "responsible
person." The issuer cannot be sued under either liability provision. 
128
Under the Listing Regulations the liability is limited to the directors
and presumably does not encompass accountants, lawyers, or others,
since the directors are the only "responsible" persons under the
Listing Regulations.1 29 The question of who is liable is further com-
plicated in the case of multinational offerings in several member
countries. In other member states other categories of persons might
be responsible. The question that arises is whether these persons
will be liable in the U.K. 130
The superimposition of the EEC directives onto the existing regulatory
framework is consequently very problematic. While simple to do, it leaves
to practice the task of working out the bugs. Probably for that reason,
U.K. lawyers at present oppose the idea of a directive governing unlisted
securities1 31 in that it would probably destroy the remaining delicate bal-
ance in the U.K. system of securities laws.
124. See Morgan, supra note 91, at 382.
125. Id.; see also Welch, supra note 99, at 248; Wooldridge, supra note 113, at 12.
126. See Welch, supra note 99, at 248.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id. at 25 1.
130. Id. at 252.
131. See Sugarman, Harmonization of Prospectuses: The Draft Directive on Unlisted
Securities, 3 COMP. LAW. 126, 127-28 (1982).
VOL. 21, NO. 3
EEC LAW AND THE SEC PROPOSAL 815
V. Tentative Synopsis of Disclosure
under EEC and U.S. Law
In comparing the two disclosure systems under review, one has to keep
in mind that the EEC directive does not directly address the problem of
multinational offerings. Nor does it address offerings by foreign issuers.
Since the disclosure requirements are mere minimum standards, they do
not reflect the present disclosure requirements in the U.K. either. They
do, however, reflect the minimum standards that cannot be undercut by
waiver of the competent authorities. The requirements apply to foreign
issuers as well as to domestic issuers. Compliance by issuers domiciled
in other member states is easy, since the minimum disclosure is uniform.
The member states are nevertheless free to add on additional requirements
under article 5 of the Prospectus Directive, and the London Stock Ex-
change makes frequent use of that power.132
A. THE PROSPECTUS FORMAT
Unlike the U.S. disclosure systems, the EEC Schedule A is not inte-
grated with the continuous reporting provisions. The best way to compare
both systems is to look at Form F-I and Schedule A. Schedule A is divided
into chapters with the headings: persons responsible for the listing par-
ticulars (Ch. 1), the admission to listing and the shares for which appli-
cation for admission is made (Ch. 2), the general information about the
issuer and its capital (Ch. 3), the activities of the issuer (Ch. 4), financial
information (Ch. 5), administration, management, and supervision (Ch.
6), and recent developments and prospects (Ch. 7).
The information in Form F-I, in contrast, is divided into the following
items: Forepart and Front Cover (Item 1), Inside Front and Back Cover
Pages (Item 2), Summary Information, Risk Factors, and Ratio of Earnings
(Item 3), Use of Proceeds (Item 4), Dilution (Item 6), Selling Security
Holders (Item 7), Plan of Distribution (Item 8), Description of Securities
to be Registered (Item 9), Interests of Named Experts and Counsel (Item
10), and Information about the Registrant (Item 11), which corresponds
to Form 20-F under the 1934 Act.
Form 20-F is divided into the following parts: Business Description
(Item 1), Description of Properties (Item 2), Legal Proceedings (Item 3),
Control (Item 4), Trading Market (Item 5), Exchange Controls and Tax-
ation (Items 6 and 7), Financial Data (Item 8), Management's Discussion
and Analysis (Item 9), Directors and Officers (Item 10), Compensation
(Item i1), Options (Item 12), Certain Transactions (Item 13), Description
132. See Wooldridge, supra note 113, at 7.
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of the Securities to be Registered (Item 14), Defaults upon Senior Secu-
rities (Item 15), Recent Changes in Security (Item 16) and the Financial
Statements (Items 17 and 18).
The integrated disclosure system makes the allocation of certain items
more confusing than under the EEC prospectus format. Table 2 in the
Appendix shows how the different items and chapters correspond to each
other. The table shows readily that any reciprocity approach should either
abandon disclosure based on a specific prospectus format, or should re-
quire a cross reference sheet. Such a cross reference sheet is obtained if
Table 2 is reversed, as is shown on Table 3 in the Appendix.
B. SUBSTANTIVE DISCLOSURE
Achieving a complete match with respect to the information to be dis-
closed under the different systems is an illusory ideal. In some respects
the U.S. requirements are more detailed, in other respects the EEC system
seems more comprehensive. Table 2 shows that some items in Form F-I
have no correspondence in Schedule A. Dilution and Selling Shareholders
(Items 6 and 7) are probably obsolete under the European system, since
they apply only if a shareholder sells securities. The EEC regulation
addresses only the issuer. Therefore a conflict between the two systems
should not arise for U.K. issuers selling in the U.S. A U.S. issuer might
not be able to coregister securities sold by shareholders.
Part 1 of Form F-I, the 500 series of Regulation S-K, is fairly identical
to Chapters 2 and 3 of Schedule A. The only major difference is that the
EEC provisions do not require a specific mention of 'isk factors. Certainly,
the risk factors must be disclosed under EEC law, but they are not sum-
marized at a specific place. The investor therefore has to make his or her
own risk assessment based on the information scattered all over the listing
particular, whereas Item 3 of Form F-I requires the issuer to do this task.
On the other hand, Schedule A.7.2. requires the issuer to discuss the
prospects of the enterprise, whereas Rule 175133 merely allows him to do
so. Chapter 7.2. of Schedule A might also include an analysis of the risks
of the particular investment. Both systems require disclosure of the capital
of the issuer, the amount of underwriting commissions, the use of pro-
ceeds, and the plan of distribution.
More interesting are the divergences in the area of Form 20-F. In some
respects, the dissimilarities are negligible, partly due to the fact that Form
20-F makes explicit reference to foreign disclosure requirements, such as
in Items 11, 12, 13, and 17. Central to any disclosure is the description
of the issuer and its activities. The European form is much more detailed
133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1986).
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with respect to the participation of the issuer in "undertakings," that is,
other enterprises and joint ventures. The financial situation of these un-
dertakings has to be discussed extensively. Form 20-F merely requires a
description of the issuer and its subsidiaries. Under EEC law, the under-
takings have to be described in detail if they account for more than ten
percent of the issuer's capital or profits (Schedule A.5.2.).
The U.S. disclosure requirements lay much more emphasis on the risk
factors, as related to the particular enterprise or industry. The EEC di-
rective never mentions the word "risk" in Schedule A. An example is
Schedule A.4.2., where the issuer must disclose the dependency on pat-
ents, licenses, etc., "if such factors are of fundamental importance to the
issuer's business or profitability."1 34 The corresponding language in Item I
of Form 20-F, states, inter alia, that the issuer must disclose "risk factors"
such as "expiration of ... patents, trademarks, licenses."1
35
Quite obviously, the leitmotiv of U.S. disclosure is the description of
negative factors and a healthy skepticism about the mention of positive
factors. In contrast, the European approach seems to be towards a more
balanced and neutral disclosure with no specific emphasis on negative
factors. In general, U.S. disclosure addresses more the lay investor and
mandates the issuer to mark any risk factor as such. Under the European
system, disclosure is aimed more towards the investor's adviser. 136 This
targeting of the prospectus leaves it open to the reader to evaluate the
risks involved in the investment and requires the investor to do his or her
own risk analysis. The EEC approach seems more realistic. For the most
part, the prospectus is read by professional investors or investment ad-
visers. On the other hand, the risk factor analysis might be the only part
of the prospectus that is actually read by the lay investor. The EEC
approach has the disadvantage of lacking a specific section where all
negative information is summarized and evaluated.
Under U.S. disclosure, the segmented reporting requirement that was
originally relaxed in Item I of Form 20-F is reintroduced in Item 18. This
segmented reporting is required in EEC law only if the operating results
are atypically distributed among the different segments of the issuer's
business.137 The segmented reporting in the financial statements operates
as a heavy burden on the foreign issuer. Besides this point of concern,
the accounting principles in the U.S. and the EEC differ slightly, but have
134. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 4, at 22.
135. Form 20-F Item 1(b), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,781 (1982) (emphasis by the author).
136. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 4, art. 4(l) at 2.
137. See Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 (EEC) No. 78/660, 21 0. J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 222) art. 43(l)(8) at 26 (1978) (contents of annual accounts and reports); id. § 3, at
13 (layout of the balance sheet).
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the same overall intent of giving a fair view of the financial status of an
enterprise. 138
With the exception of some minor points of concern, the disclosures
under both systems seem fairly similar with respect to management re-
muneration, the number of shares held by the management, and stock
option plans. Both systems require disclosure merely of an aggregate
amount. Form 20-F does lower the informational requirements with re-
spect to the management's expertise, background, and outside activi-
ties. 139 The similarity in this area can be credited in full to the SEC's look
to European securities law. With respect to disclosure of major share-
holders, however, the provisions are still not in harmony even though
Form 20-F relaxed the disclosure. Form 20-F still requires disclosure of
any holder of more than ten percent of the issuer's stock, compared to
five percent for domestic issuers. Schedule A sets the threshold at twenty
percent, but in addition mandates the disclosure of any person exercising
control over the issuer.140
VI. Conclusion: Feasibility of Transatlantic
Multinational Offerings Facilitation
A. DIVERGENCE OF DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
As shown above, the major philosophical difference between the EEC
and U.S. disclosure is a stricter emphasis in the U.S. on negative risk
factors. In contrast, the EEC provisions leave it to the investor to draw
the appropriate conclusions. Nevertheless, the SEC's look to Europe has
proven very helpful in achieving a limited harmony in disclosure stan-
dards. Some points, over which one may argue, make it more likely that
supplemental information will be indispensable in order to protect the
U.S. investor. As can be derived from the Summary of Comments, 14 1 a
per se reciprocity without any supplemental disclosure is unrealistic. Even
a modified reciprocity approach would be helpful, if it saves the expense
of reformatting the information. To reorganize the prospectus format
amounts to a complete redrafting, which is costly and time-consuming.
Any approach under which the EEC prospectus can be furnished without
redrafting, and supplemented by a "wrap around" prospectus, would
already be a substantial facilitation.14 2 Whether the ABA list of indis-
138. See Pierce, supra note 19, at 141.
139. Pierce, supra note 19, at 136.
140. Compare Form 20-F Item 4(b), 47 Fed. Reg. 54,771 (1982) with Schedule A.3.2.7.,
Prospectus Directive, supra note 4, at II.
141. See supra note 21.
142. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 29.
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pensable information is an appropriate selection is, however, open to
discussion.
As shown above, from the U.S. viewpoint, an explicit description of
risk factors seems to be indispensable in order to bring an EEC prospectus
in line with the U.S. philosophy of investor protection.143 Yet, it seems
that a Management's Discussion and Analysis is superfluous. This dis-
cussion is in most prospectuses a lengthy repetition of information con-
tained elsewhere. 144 Whether a specific Methodology of Distribution should
be discussed, is also debatable. This information should already be present
in Schedule A.2.3.2., which provides that in multinational offerings, the
reservation of a specific "tranche" to a particular country must be dis-
closed, as well as in other parts of Chapter 2.3.
The most important relaxation seems to be the abolition of the "in-
creased financial disclosure" contained in Item 18. The ABA and others
seem to cling to this information as indispensable.1 45 The segmented fi-
nancials are heartily disliked by foreign issuers. 146 Since the EEC ac-
counting rules provide for disclosure in the case of atypical distribution
of earnings among the different segments, the U.S. investor will still get
the segmented information if it is important.
The essence of any reciprocity approach is to keep the amount of
supplemental information as small as possible. Abolition of Item 18 seems
to be one of the accommodations necessary to facilitate multinational
offerings. It is hard to understand why Item I of Form 20-F substantially
relaxes the requirement of segmented reporting, but fails to do the same
thing with respect to the financial information in Item 18. Since Item 18-
type financials are a prerequisite to taking advantage of the integrated
disclosure system for most practical purposes, the relaxed segmented
reporting is illusory at present.147 As long as the financial information is
reconciled with respect to the measurement principles, as presently pro-
vided in Item 17 of Form 20-F, a satisfactory investor protection is war-
ranted. 148 Items of special interest for the U.S. investor are the exchange
rate risk and the taxation risk. Therefore, Items 6 and 7 of Form 20-F
should form part of the indispensable information.
As far as the reverse side of the coin is concerned-the accommodation
of EEC disclosure to U.S. issuers-one has to keep in mind that Schedule A
is not an administrative regulation that can be altered easily. Again, a
143. Id. at 39.
144. But see id. at 37-38.
145. See ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at 7; Karmel, supra note 60, at 4, col. 2.
146. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 18 (Royal Dutch and Shell) 37 (Unilever).
147. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
148. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 35-36 (the London Stock Exchange
even expressed the view that any form of reconciliation of GAAP is unnecessary).
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substantial accommodation may be achieved if the U.S. prospectus format
could be used in a multinational offering in the U.K. securities market.
With respect to the contents of the prospectus, only one supplemental
information seems to be necessary to fulfill the disclosure requirements
of the Prospectus Directive, namely a more thorough information with
respect to the participation of the issuer in "undertakings" according to
Schedule A.5.2.
Information about the future prospects of the issuer according to Sched-
ule A.7.2. are part of the European disclosure philosophy, but this pro-
vision stipulates, too, that the competent authorities can grant a waiver
from this requirement. For U.S. issuers, publication of forecasts is not
part of their regular disclosure. Rule 175 is apparently not used very
frequently. U.S. issuers apparently fear being held liable under section
II of the 1933 Act if the forecasted results do not materialize. It would,
therefore, be very helpful if the competent authorities generally exempted
U.S. issuers from compliance with Chapter 7.2. of Schedule A.
As far as the format is concerned, it seems that the EEC directive does
not really mandate compliance with the format of Schedule A. 149 Article
5(l) sets forth that member states shall ensure that "listing particulars
contain, in as easily analyzable and comprehensible a form as possible at
least the items of information provided for in Schedules A, B or C."150
This wording is a clear indicator that the directive does not mandate a
specific format. As a result, a U.S. prospectus, supplemented by infor-
mation on undertakings, as suggested above, and a cross-reference sheet
similar to Table 2 should be sufficient.
The question of to what extent the London Stock Exchange will accept
such a prospectus and regard it as complying with the Yellow Book is
beyond the scope of this article. However, the London Stock Exchange
was one of the commentators that advocated a per se reciprocity ap-
proach.' 51 The Exchange appears therefore, to accept U.S. disclosure as
close enough to the requirements of the Yellow Book.
B. OTHER AREAS OF NECESSARY HARMONIZATION
As the ABA-Letter and other comments indicate, the problem of multi-
national offerings does not hinge only on divergences in prospectus for-
mats and contents. A successful solution should take into account the
other stumbling blocks as well. In the area of disclosure requirements,
harmonization seems easier to achieve, since at least in the U.S. a simple
149. See J. KLAGES, supra note 91, at 105.
150. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 4, at 3.
15 1. See Summmary of Comments, supra note 2 1, at 29.
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modification of administrative regulations will be sufficient. This approach
is for the most part not true with respect to liability provisions, problems
of prefiling communications to the investors, and the problems of after-
market regulation. This article discusses those issues briefly, although at
least in some areas, a solution without congressional action seems
unfeasible.
1. Liabilities
The liabilities provisions will always remain a major point of concern,
and the SEC has declared any accommodation off-limits. Of course, any
foreign issuer who offers securities in the U.S. will fear the harsh U.S.
antifraud provisions regardless of whether the offering is multinational or
not. Additional problems with respect to multinational offerings will, how-
ever, arise. Persons will become subject to liability who ordinarily are not
involved in international securities offerings. The essence of a prospectus
harmonization will be the use of opinions and exhibits prepared for the
domestic market in a multinational offering. Experts, for instance, are
not considered as "persons responsible" under the U.K. Listing Regu-
lations. That does not mean that these persons are not liable under U.K.
law; their liability is, however, dependent on negligence. 152 Under U.S.
law, section 1 l(b)(3)(B) of the 1933 Act, the burden of proof would shift
to the expert for due diligence. In addition, underwriters in the U.K. are
only jointly, but not severally liable, which may also prove to be a de-
terrent for U.K. issues on the U.S. market. 153
The multinational offerings arena will, however, in all likelihood, only
be entered by sound companies where a liability case is highly unlikely
to arise. If a multinational offering exemption is limited to "world class"
issuers, the risks of a liability case are further eliminated. One commen-
tator pointed out that the market forces would probably confine multi-
national offerings to "senior" or "world class" issuers.
154
Liability, of course, depends to a large extent on the substantive dis-
closure requirements. In this respect the aforementioned slightly different
emphasis on the disclosure of risk factors in the different systems might
create a problem. A U.S. investor might sue on the ground that the U.K.
prospectus did not specifically outline the risks of the investment, as
required under U.S. law. On the other hand, a risk factor item should be
part of the supplemental information package. In addition, an EEC pro-
spectus must give an accurate picture of the issuer's situation. A case in
152. See the "classic" case of Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partner Ltd., 1964 A.C.
465 (1963). For a discussion of the impact of Hedley see Welch, supra note 99, at 250.
153. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 21.
154. Id. at 83.
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which a prospectus might be deemed misleading under U.S. law, but not
under EEC law is therefore unlikely. Hence, a multinational offerings
facilitation will not be substantially impaired by existing liability provisions.
2. The Underwriting and Filing Procedure
The effect of pre-prospectus communications is a point of concern.
Section 5(c) of the 1933 Act forbids these communications completely.
The SEC cannot grant exemptions from the term "Offer for Sale" as
defined in section 2(3). However, the SEC has rulemaking power under
section 2(10) of the 1933 Act to exempt certain types of communications
from the prospectus definition. Nevertheless the SEC has, in rule 135,
defined the term "Offer for Sale" and has exempted "Tombstone Ads."
The competent authorities in Europe have a similar discretionary power
under article 22 of the Prospectus Directive. It seems feasible for the
competent authorities to agree on an internationally acceptable form of
prefiling communications in the case of intended multinational offerings. 155.
More difficult is the harmonization of the filing process as a whole in
order to eliminate the intricate timing problems involved to achieve a
simultaneous effective date. 156 Any delay in the review process might
destroy the planned schedule of distribution. A close cooperation of all
participating review authorities, as envisioned in article 24(1) of the Pro-
spectus Directive is crucial, and an international multilateral agreement
might be necessary to achieve that cooperation. One commentator showed
that it is possible for a U.K. issuer to use the U.K. domestic subscription
system in a multinational simultaneous offering in the U.S. if the sales
are not made final before the "impact" day. 157 Another comment pointed
out that the underwriting process in the U.K. is likely to become more
similar to the U.S. type in the future. 158
Another area of possible complications may arise from the different
stabilizing possibilities in the separate capital markets. The immediate
aftermarket might offer arbitraging opportunities. 159 A period of a couple
of days, during which transborder transactions are prohibited, could pre-
vent this problem. The difficulty is how such a prohibition might be cre-
ated, and how it can be enforced. Self-regulatory measures of the national
stock exchanges will probably be best.
155. See also ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at 15.
156. See ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at Appendix for a detailed description of the problems
involved.
157. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 89.
158. Id. at 88.
159. See ABA-Letter, supra note 63, at 15.
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3. Periodic Reporting
A multinational offering facilitation is useless if the issuer is subse-
quently forced to comply with the 1934 Act reporting requirements; a
filing of a Form 20-F at a later time would merely defer the moment at
which the rewriting of disclosure information becomes necessary. If a
foreign issuer will be subject to the 1934 Act filing procedure at some
time, he might as well comply at the time of his first multinational offering.
Any facilitation effort would lose its appeal without some sort of accom-
modation in the area of periodic reporting.
Commentators have expressed opposing views on the deterrent effect
of the present periodic reporting requirements. At least two commentators
have pointed out that a multinational offerings facilitation is ineffective
without relaxations in the area of periodic reporting.160 Since a European
issuer (of world class, for example) has to file interim reports, information
is available. Presumably, the larger the issuer is, the more information
will be publicly available. It should suffice that an issuer files all these
materials, as presently stipulated in Rule 12g3-2 for issuers of unlisted
securities. A mere "grace period" as proposed in the ABA-Letter' 61 will
not suffice to render a multinational offering facilitation attractive. A
"mirror image" modified reciprocity approach modeled after the multi-
national offerings facilitation in the periodic reporting area might, how-
ever, be a feasible way to enhance the attractiveness of a multinational
offering facilitation. 162
C. OUTLOOK
A "modified" reciprocity approach appears to be the most feasible
form of multinational offering facilitation; that is, a solution in which a
domestic prospectus may be filed in conjunction with a supplemental
"wrap around" prospectus containing the missing minimum disclosure.
With respect to the U.K., this minimum supplemental information should
be limited to essential or indispensable items, such as: (1) a cross reference
sheet similar to Table 3 in the Appendix; (2) a risk factors analysis; (3) a
reconciliation of the financial statements with U.S. GAAP in a generic
form, similar to the present Item 17 of Form 20-F; and (4) summary
information about exchange controls and taxation. Information to be con-
sidered as dispensable includes (1) a Management's Analysis and Dis-
cussion and (2) segmented reporting, including segmented financials.
160. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 74.
161. Supra note 63, at 11.
162. See Summary of Comments, supra note 21, at 74-75.
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The deregulation of the London Stock Exchange ("Big Bang") has
lured foreign securities firms to London, thereby increasing access for
foreign investors to the U.K. securities market. While "Big Bang" af-
fected secondary trading only, it remains to be seen whether increased
foreign presence in the U.K. market will lead to an increase of interna-
tional and multinational offerings. If this is the case, a multinational of-
ferings facilitation will be helpful in fostering the ongoing internationali-
zation of the world securities markets.
The SEC is apparently heading towards a relaxation for multinational
offerings in the area of investment grade debt issued by world class is-
suers.163 Such a precursor regulation should be broadened as soon as
possible to encompass ordinary cash offerings of equity as well. A later
inclusion of the EEC in general may be desirable and feasible.
163. See Address by SEC Chairman John Shad, at the National Press Club, Washington
D.C. (Dec. 11, 1985) at 10 (copy on file with the author).
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APPENDIX
Table I
Appropriate Forms for Foreign
Issuers under the 1933 Act
Reporting
World CI. Company 20-F Last 20-F Type of Sees. Appropriate
Issuer: for: filed: included: offered: Form:
Yes 36 months Yes Item 18 Any Cash Offer F-3
Yes less than 36 One Item 18 F-2
months
n/a 36 months Yes Item 17 Investment Grade F-3
nonconv. debt
n/a less than 36 One Item 18 Investment Grade F-2
months nonconv. debt
No 36 months Yes Item 18 Any Cash Offer F-2
Yes 36 months Yes Item 17 Rights Offering F-3
Yes less than 36 One Item 17 F-2
months
No less than 36 One Item 17 F-2
months
n/a not required No Item 18 Exchange and F-I
(in F-I) residual cash off.
n/a not required No Item 17 Rights Offering F-I
(in F-I)
Table 2
Synopsis of U.S. and EEC Prospectus Formats*
EEC Prospectus Directive U.S. 1933 Act
Schedule A F-Series Form
Chapter 1 Form F-I Signatures
Chapter 2 Form F-I Items 4, 5, 8 and 9
Form 20-F Items 5, 7 and 14
Chapter 3 Form F-I Items I and 2
Form 20-F Item 4
Chapters 4 and 5 Form 20-F Items I to 3, 8, 9, 17 (18)
Chapter 6 Form 20-F Items 10, il, 12 and 13
Chapter 7 (part I) Form 20-F Item 9
Chapter 7 (part 2) No Correspondence but see Rule 175
No Correspondence - F-I F-I Item 3 (Risk Factors)
Item 6 (Dilution)
Item 7 (Selling Shareholders)
Item 10 (Interests of Named Experts)
No Correspondence - 20-F Item 6 (Exchange Controls)
Item 7 (Taxation)
Item 15 (Senior Securities)
Item 16 (Recent Changes in Security)
*For a more detailed synopsis on the basis of "old" Form 20-F see Pozen, International Securities
Markets, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 199 (1981) (author: Douglas Hawes).
SUMMER 1987
826 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
VOL. 21, NO. 3
Table 3
Cross Reference Sheet
U.S. 1933 Act EEC Prospectus Directive
F-Series Forms Schedule A
Item 1 Chapter 3
Item 2 Chapter 3
Item 3 Chapter 5 (No Full Correspondence)
Items 4 and 5 Chapter 2
Item 6 No Correspondence
Item 7 No Correspondence
Item 8 Chapter 2
Item 9 Chapter 2
Item 10 No Correspondence
Item II (= Form 20-F) See Below
U.S. 1934 Exchange Act EEC Prospectus Directive
Form 20-F Schedule A
Items I and 2 Chapters 4 and 5
Item 3 Chapter 4
Item 4 Chapter 3
Item 5 Chapter 2
Items 6 and 7 No Correspondence
Item 8 Chapter 5
Item 9 Chapters 5 and 7
Items 10 through 13 Chapter 6
Item 14 Chapter 2
Items 15 and 16 No Correspondence
Item 17 or 18 Chapter 5
